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I. Introduction
Corruption is deemed by many economists to be detrimental to investment incentives leading
to lower economic growth. Government officials, for instance, charge entrepreneurs for
permits and licenses that they require to operate a business. These licenses, sold to maximize
the officials' private gains, constitute an additional burden on new businesses [Shleifer and
Vishny 1993]. Despite some arguments for beneficial effects of corruption [Leff 1964;
Huntington 1968], recent empirical findings support the view that corruption is harmful to
investment activities. Mauro [1995] shows that corruption lowers private investment, thereby
reducing economic growth. In a study of the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment
(FDI), Wei [1997a] finds that a rise in the corruption level in a host country reduces the
inflow of FDI. In particular, an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that
of Mexico is shown to be equivalent to an increase in the tax rate of more than 20 percentage
points.1
This paper is concerned with the dynamics of corruption. More specifically, we ask
whether the government officials' ex post opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs
have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. To answer this
question, we develop a simple model of repeated extortion. As in Shleifer and Vishny [1993],
we consider the sale of government property by government officials as the prototype of
extortion activities. We show that the inability of government officials to commit to future
demands does not distort entry decisions any further if the choice of technology is not a
decision variable for the entrepreneurs. The government official can properly discount the
initial demand in order to induce the appropriate amount of entry. If, however, the choice of
technology is left to the entrepreneurs, the dynamic path of demand schedules will induce
entrepreneurs to adopt an inefficient "fly-by-night" strategy. They will choose a technology
1
 Corruption is not an activity that is confined to any particular corner of the world. Even though there are large
differences in the level of corruption between countries, some type of corruption can be found in almost every
country. Even for the US which is usually ranked highly in terms of efficient, non-corrupt bureaucracies, Fesler
and Kettl [1991, pp. 332f.] report that "in an FBI 'sting' operation, 105 out of 106 offers of bribes to suspected
municipal officials in the State of New York were accepted; the 106th was rejected as too small". At the other
end of the corruption scale are countries like Uganda and Zaire. Under Idi Amin's regime in Uganda, for
instance, government became little more than a system of organized crime used to extract rents from the public
[World Development Report 1997, p. 106]. See Gould [1980] for a detailed analysis of corruption in Zaire.
with inefficiently low sunk cost component, which allows them to react more flexibly to
future demands from corrupt officials. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of the
government officials and the entrepreneurs' technology choices. In particular, we show that
there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Once entry decisions are made by entrepreneurs, the
government officials' optimal strategy is to demand varying amounts of money. This
provides a new interpretation of the arbitrariness that entrepreneurs often face in a corrupt
environment; uncertainty is simply an equilibrium property of repeated extortion.2
The repeated demands in extortion are well-documented (see, for instance, John T.
Noonan's [1984] comprehensive study on bribes). How extortion can almost become an art is
illustrated by the case of cardinal Tommaso di Capua who became head of the Pope's
Chancery under Innocent III in 1215. His letters written between 1215 and 1239 were even
published a few years later in Summa Dictaminis - a handbook for correspondence in
connection with 'presents'. Some gifts were sent back: "We have just become friends, don't
rush it." Other letters give an eloquent but clear signal that additional payments are expected:
"Be prepared to come back later (...) with fatter recompense (retributio). Therefore let your
ready hand not grow lukewarm in the future nor put obstacle to later payments so that with
repeated benefits you make your friends more devoted" [Noonan (1984, p. 201)]. A more
contemporary example that nicely illustrates our point is the investment history of Gulf Oil
Corporation in South Korea. In 1966, when Gulf had invested $200 million in South Korea,
the incumbent party asked for $1 million contribution to finance its election campaign. As
John T. Noonan [1984, 638] notes, "[t]he request was accompanied by pressure which left
little to the imagination." Unfortunately for Gulf, elections are held repeatedly. So four years
later, S.K. Kim, a leader of the incumbent party, asked again for a 'campaign contribution'.
This time, the demand was $10 million.
2
 Scott [1972, p. 83] reports on corruption in Indonesia: "(...) in Indonesia the corruption 'market' was so
disorganized that 'prices' were highly unstable and 'delivery' by sellers was highly uncertain." According to
Robert Klitgaard's (1990, pp. 94f) description of corruption in Equatorial Guinea, "[t]here are no electricity
meters so one might be asked to pay a million and a half cefas a month even though one had the generator going
for twenty days." On the effects of corruption-induced uncertainty, Wei's [1997b] empirical study concludes
that it is not only corruption itself but also the uncertainty created by corrupt officials that deters FDI.
This paper builds on the works by Shleifer and Vishny [1993] and Bliss and Di Telia
[1997].3 Shleifer and Vishny's main concern is to investigate how the harmful effects of
corruption depend on "the industrial organization of corruption." They argue that when
corruption activities are decentralized, the harmful effects of corruption are accentuated. As
different agencies set their bribery demands independently in order to maximize their own
revenue, they do not take the negative externalities on other agencies' revenues into account.
As in Cournot (1927), corruption among independently bribe-setting officials results in a
lower level of entry and thus a lower aggregate level of revenue than the joint optimum. Bliss
and Di Telia [1997] investigate the relationship between market competition and corruption.
They recognize that the extent of competition is not an exogenous parameter since corruption
itself can affect the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium through the endogenously
determined level of graft. In a model where the level of corruption and the extent of entry are
co-determined by what they call "deep competition" parameters, they show that there is no
simple relationship between competition and corruption, thus questioning the validity of a
commonly held belief that competitive pressures in the market can mitigate corruption. In this
paper, we are concerned with dynamic aspects of corruption. As in Bliss and Di Telia [1997],
we abstract from the issue of coordination among corrupt officials and only consider a
monopoly corruption scheme; there is only one official who can issue the license which is
required to run a business and this official demands illegal side payments for his services.4
However, we extend the analysis to a dynamic situation where the official who has collected
the bribe previously comes back to demand more. We analyze whether there are additional
harmful effects on resource allocation due to the possibility of repeated extortion.
The formal structure of the problem is similar to the licensing model by Farrell and
Gallini [1987] where consumers incur setup costs to use a new product. This creates a
3
 The seminal paper on the economics of corruption is Rose-Ackerman [1975]. For a recent survey of the
literature, the reader is referred to Ades and Di Telia [1997].
4
 It is not always a subordinate government employee who exacts money from businesses in an ex post
opportunistic manner. In 17th century England, it was the Crown itself that expropriated wealth from citizens ~
against the will of the Parliament. One method used by the Crown was to demand 'loans' which were neither
voluntarily given nor likely to be repaid [North and Weingast 1989]. In 19th century US, local ruling party
organisations forced utilities or other corporations to pay large bribes by threatening the firm to enact a
legislation that would be harmful to the firm's investment [Miller 1989].
dynamic consistency problem for the monopolist once consumers have incurred these costs.
The main result is that second-sourcing through licensing can serve as a price commitment for
the future when long-term contracts with consumers are infeasible due to the nonverifiability
of quality. In our extortion model, however, there is no such mechanism to commit to a future
demand since a corrupt official with the power to extort usually does not possess a credible
mechanism to promise 'competition among corrupt officials' in the future. In the context of
corruption, it is also natural to assume that the long-term contracts are not enforceable in that
they involve illegal activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section II, we set up
the basic model of dynamic extortion with only one type of technology. We show that the
inability to commit to future demand does not entail further efficiency losses from the
commitment solution because the official can give a discount in the first period for his future
opportunistic behavior. In Section III, we enrich the model with the endogenous choice of
technologies by potential entrants. In Section IV, we analyze how the stability of a corrupt
regime affects economic performance. The dynamic problem analyzed in the paper can also
be applied to various other situations where agents have the power to extort such as in
organized crime and the expropriation of multinational corporations by host governments. We
conclude with a brief discussion of these extensions.
II. The Basic Model of Repeated Extortion
We develop a two-period model of repeated extortion. Consider a government official who
has the power to issue licenses that allow entrepreneurs to open a shop.5 The official sets the
price of the license to maximize revenues from licensing. In addition to the licensee fee,
entrepreneurs need to incur costs of AT to enter the business, which are assumed to be sunk.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their ability to generate (net) income in each
period, denoted by v. Let us normalise the total population of entrepreneurs to unity. The
5
 As pointed out by Stigler (1971), "[t]he state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with
even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce." The state's monopoly on coercion can lead to the abuse
of power when public officials have wide discretion and little accountability due to the lack of formal checks
and balances [World Development Report 1997].
distribution of abilities is given by the inverse cumulative distribution function F{v) with
continuous density F'< 0, that is, F(v) denotes the proportion of entrepreneurs who can
generate income more than v in each period. The type of entrepreneurs is private information
to entrepreneurs. The government official knows only the distribution of types. Once the
entrepreneurs have made their sunk investment, the official may require that for the
continuation of the business the license be renewed later at a fee.
The Static Problem
We first analyse a static problem as a benchmark. This preliminary analysis also helps us
develop notation. Consider the official's one-period static problem when the entrepreneur has
operating cost of c. All players are assumed to be risk neutral. If the official demands m for
the license, the marginal type who is indifferent between entry and exit is given by v = m + c .
Thus, the official solves:
(1) maxm- F(c + m)
m
The first order condition for the optimal m is given by:
(2) F(c + m) + m- F'(c + m) = 0
We make the standard assumption that the distribution of types satisfies the monotone hazard
rate condition, that is, F'lF is increasing:
(3) F"F-(F')2>0
This assumption ensures that the official's objective function is quasi-concave and the second
order condition for the maximization problem is satisfied:
(4) 2 6
Let m*(c) be implicitly defined by (2) and be the solution to the above problem, i.e.,
(5) m * (c) = argmax m • F(c + m) ,
6
 Using the first order condition, we can rewrite the second order condition as
2 • F' (c + m) - F" (c + m)- F(c + m) I F' (c + m) < 0. The second order condition holds if the distribution F
satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition. This condition is a standard assumption in the incentive literature
and is satisfied by most widely used distributions; see Fudenberg and Tirole [1991, p. 267].
and let R(c) = m*(c)-F(c + m*(c)) be the indirect revenue function for the official. Then,
the marginal entrepreneur is given by v * (c) = c + m * (c).




 ~ 1 7 ~ = ~ [s.o.c] '
where [s.o.c] denotes the second order condition (4) and is negative. By using the first order
condition and condition (3), we can verify that the numerator is negative (F'+m-F"< 0).
Thus,
(7) dm*(c)/dc<0.
As the operating cost of entrepreneurs increases, the optimal monetary demand by the official
decreases. However, the overall effect of the increased operating cost on the extent of entry is
negative:
( 8 ) ^ Q
dc dc [s.o.c]
By using the envelope theorem, we can also verify that
(9) w ( c ) F < 0
dc
The official's revenue decreases with the increase of the entrepreneurs' operating cost.
The Dynamic Problem with Commitment
We now consider a dynamic (two-period) problem where the official can come back to
demand more in the second period. The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the first
period, the official demands mx as a licensee fee for opening a business. Potential
entrepreneurs know their own type (v) and decide whether to enter or not. If they enter, they
have to make specific investment of A" which is not recoverable upon exit. Let us assume that
there is no further operating cost once the sunk investment is made.7 In the second period, the
official can demand more money (m2) as a license renewal fee given the number of firms that
7
 This assumption is made without any loss of generality since we can interpret v as the income generated net of
any operating cost.
entered in the first period. The firms who entered in the first period decide whether to stay in
the business by paying m2 or exit from the market (see Figure 1). Those firms that did not
enter in the first period can potentially enter the market in the second period by paying m2 in
addition to the sunk cost of K. As shown in the Appendix, however, there will be no new
entry in the second period in equilibrium.







Figure 1. The Timing of Repeated Extortion Game
The official cannot price discriminate against the existing firms and give discounts to
new entrants in the second period. This reflects our assumption about the information
structure the government official has in the second period about individual entrepreneurs. We
assume that the entrepreneurs are anonymous in that the existing firms can disguise as new
entrants if any discounts are offered to new entrants.8 This implies that there are no incentives
for the entrepreneurs to delay their entry to disguise as low types in order to elicit the discount
later, as in the ratchet model (Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole, 1985; Laffont and Tirole, 1988).
The official cannot commit to m2 before entry occurs in the first period. Thus, the
official has the temptation to exploit those who incurred sunk costs in the first period. In this
setting, we ask whether the official's ex post opportunism distorts the resource allocation any
further. To answer this question, however, we first consider the counterfactual case where the
official can commit to his future demand in the first period before the entry decisions are made
Let mx and m2 be the monetary demands by the official in period 1 and period 2,
respectively. In Appendix Al, we establish that the optimum is to have the same number of
firms in both periods.9
8
 It may be technically feasible to give discounts to existing firms by demanding them to submit the original
license. However, there is no incentive to do that for the official in the second period.
9
 A similar proof is given in Farrell and Gallini (1987) in the context of technology adoption.
Given that the number of firms staying in the market is constant across periods in the
optimum, the marginal type who is indifferent between entry and exit is defined by
v ( l + 5) = K + m{ +5-/w2, where 5 < 1 is the discount factor. For the marginal investor
[v = (K + mx +6-m2 )/(l + 8)], the present value of profits has to be equal to the start-up costs
plus the present value of bribes. Thus, in the commitment solution, the corrupt official solves
the following problem:
A m, + o • m(10) Max(m,+b-m2)-F 1+5 1+5
Let m = (mx + 6-m2)/(l + 5) be the average discounted monetary demand by the official.
Then, the first order condition can be written as:
The optimal commitment solution is mc = m*\K{ ~] = (TM,C + S• m2c)/{[ + S). In other
words, any combination of (w,c, m2c) that has the same discounted average of
m
c
= m * \K/ A can be the optimal solution. For instance, constant demands of
mx =m2 = m*I y | + g) are optimal. The marginal entrant is v c = /\ + g + m*(/| + 5)•
Proposition 1. Any combination of mxc (>0) and m2c that has the same discounted average
value of {mf + 5 • m2 )/(l + 5) = mc =m*\^/+ g) is optimal for the corrupt official. The
marginal type of entrepreneur who is indifferent between entering and staying out is given by
vc =% x + m*w{ A)- Thus> t n e solution is equivalent to the repetition of the static
revenue maximization problem when the entrepreneurs' per period cost is given by K/ ^.
The Dynamic Problem without Commitment
Now let us analyze the case where the official cannot commit to the future level of demand
before the entry decision is made. In this case too, we can demonstrate that the optimal
strategy is to induce a constant number of firms to stay in business for both periods (see
Appendix Al). Let us denote v"c as the marginal type when no commitment is possible.
Then, the official will demand m2 =vNC in the second period. Given that the whole surplus
is extracted in the second period for the marginal type, the first period demand should be
sufficiently low to induce the marginal type to invest in the sunk cost which implies that
mx
NC
 =vNC-K. Since the time-consistent demand schedule (m"c,m"c) is uniquely
determined by v"c, we will find it more convenient to treat v"c as the control variable. Thus,
the maximization problem for the official can be written as:
(12)
The first order condition for v"c is given by:
(13) F(v" c)
Thus,
(14^ vNC - —
K }
 1 + 5 " Vl + 8
determines the optimal marginal type [see (5) for the definition of the m*-function]. Using the
information on the marginal type we obtain a solution for the official's optimal bribery




++ &V 1 + 8
That is, the government official discounts the initial demand by the amount of sunk cost
{m2c - m"c = K) to compensate for his ex post opportunistic behavior.
The optimal time-consistent demand schedule above was derived assuming that the
first period demand can be negative (i.e., the initial subsidy for entry). This assumption
corresponds to the case where the sunk investment is mainly in physical capital so that the
official can verify whether the investment has been undertaken by the entrepreneurs who
received the subsidy. Alternatively, the official is able to provide the sunk investment
himself. Otherwise, the entrepreneurs will just take the money and disappear without any
investment. In such a case, we can easily verify that there are no differences between the
cases of commitment and no commitment in terms of the number of entrants and the
government official's revenue. Since the government official can induce the optimal amount
of entry by appropriately discounting his initial demand, there is no additional cost associated
with the dynamic consistency requirement.
However, there may be cases where we should impose the non-negativity constraint on
the initial demand (m"c > 0). For instance, the sunk investment may represent mainly human
capital components which cannot be observed. Then, the commitment solution can be
replicated only when the nonnegative constraint is not binding (m" c > 0), in which case the
optimal solution is once again given by (15). More specifically, note that m*\K/ A is
decreasing in K (Eq. (7)), which makes m"c = m*\)A, c j - ' /\ + s a monotonically
decreasing function of K\ there exists a unique critical value AT such that m"c > 0 if and only
if K < K. Therefore, if the cost of sunk investment is substantial (K > K), the non-negative
constraint is binding and the optimal solution is given by:
(15') < c = 0 , mN2c=vNC=K
Note that in this case (K >K), the no commitment solution entails an efficiency loss
compared to the commitment solution in that there is too little entry
Proposition 2. Let K be the unique value that satisfies m * \)4, x j = ^ /\ s. • If AT < AT,
the optimal time-consistent extortion schedule is m"c =m*\)A, « J - ^ ' % , s an<i
, ?)+ %+ g • There is no further efficiency loss due to the governmentm"c =m*
official's inability to commit to future demand in that vNC = vc = ^/ » +  m *
.
>K, the optimal schedule is m*c = 0 , m"c = vNC = K. In this case, the optimal solution
induces too little entry. In both cases, the official offers a first-period discount for the cost of
sunk investment to satisfy the dynamic consistency requirement.
We can conclude that unless the cost of sunk investment is sufficiently large, there is no
further inefficiency loss due to repeated extortion. However, we note that the demand
schedule is increasing over time due to the initial discount (m*0 -m"c = K). In the next
10
section, we argue that the entrepreneurs' incentive to take advantage of the initial discount
may lead to inefficient entry behavior if the choice of technology is endogenous. In the
remainder of this paper, we will simply assume that K < K to abstract from inefficiency
considerations due to the binding non-negative constraint on initial demand.10
III. Dynamic Extortion and the Choice of Technology
Now we assume that entrepreneurs have available another type of technology with which to
enter the market. More specifically, this alternative technology entails less sunk cost and
higher per-period operating costs. For simplicity, this technology is assumed to involve no
sunk costs and operating costs of k per period, where (\ + S)-k> K> k. Thus, the
alternative technology is less efficient if production takes place in both periods. However, it
protects the entrepreneur from the official's ex post opportunistic behavior because it does not
involve any sunk capital. We assume that the official cannot observe which type of
technology has been chosen in the first period and thus cannot price discriminate based on the
type of technology chosen. For instance, the sunk cost can be considered as an investment in
specific human capital relevant for the business.
With the availability of this short-term investment strategy, the optimal dynamic
demand schedule cannot be sustained. To see this, consider the marginal type who was
indifferent between entering and staying out in the no commitment case,
NC
 = K/ ~
t  t ri   st i  t i  t   it t s ,
vNC  / ~ + m * x)A, s)• This marginal type's surplus was completely extracted with the
choice of the ^-technology. The marginal type, however, can do better when the k-
technology becomes available. Facing the demand schedule, m"c =m*\f)A, ?J-^'*)/ ?
and m"c -m*\)A, s)+ %+ x» n e c a n enter by choosing the ^-technology in the first
period when the discount is offered by the official and exit in the second period when the
amount of extortion is increased - a strategy that may be called dynamic cream skimming}1
Choosing this alternative technology with less sunk costs yields the payoff
10
 In contrast, Farrell and Gallini's (1986) analysis of licensing focuses on the case where the non-negativity
constraint is binding.
11
 Cream skimming in the regulation literature refers to the inefficient firm's selective entry into the most
profitable markets when the regulated incumbent firm practices cross subsidization between markets (Viscusi,
11
(16) vNC -k-m?c =K-k>0.
In fact, with the demand schedule of {m"c,m"c), any entrant below type v = vNC + \K ~ kj/
will choose the ^-technology and exit from the market in the second period when m"c is
demanded. Thus, the optimal schedule identified in the previous section is no longer optimal
with the availability of a short-term investment strategy.
What will the equilibrium look like when the entrepreneurs can shield themselves
from the official's ex post opportunism by choosing the short-term investment strategy? We
first argue that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the ^-technology.
Proposition 3. There is no pure strategy equilibrium when the choice of technology is
endogenous.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
The intuition for the non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium can be explained as
follows. In the second period, the official's optimal choice is either to take advantage of the
entrepreneurs who entered with the AT-technology or to allow additional entrants with the k-
technology. If the official chooses the first option for sure, the marginal type whose entire
surplus is extracted in the second period with the ^-technology has an incentive to switch to
the ^-technology. Thus, the first option cannot be sustained as an equilibrium. If the second
option is chosen for sure, the marginal entrant with the k-technology can be better off by
entering with the .^-technology in the first period, once again upsetting the putative pure
strategy equilibrium. Thus, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
To derive the mixed strategy equilibrium, we prove in Appendix A3 that the choice of
technology is characterized by the following cut-off rule.
Lemma 1. There is a critical value v such that all types above it choose the AT-technology
whereas all entrants below it choose the ^-technology in equilibrium.
Vemon, and Harrington, 1995). In our model, the first period discount in the optimal demand schedule can be
interpreted as intertemporal subsidization.
12
Given Lemma 1, suppose that all the types above type v have entered with the K-
technology in the first period. In the second period, the relevant state variable for the official
is the cut-off value v of the entrepreneurs' types who have chosen the AT-technology. There is
no distinction between those who have entered with the k-technology and those who stayed
out in the first period because both have to incur the same cost of k to operate in the second
period.
Lemma 2. For the official to adopt a mixed strategy, the critical type v must be larger than
v*(0) = /w*(0).
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., v<v*(0). Then, the optimal strategy for the official in the second
period is to demand m2 = v * (0) = m * (0) with probability 1. Thus, we have a contradiction.
Given that v > v * (0), the optimal demand in the second period is either to charge v which
prevents any entry with the ^-technology or to charge m*(k) which allows entry with the
marginal type v * (k) = k + m * (k). The corrupt official receives a revenue of v • F(v) in the
former case and of R(k) = m*(k)-F(k + m*(k)) in the latter case. For the official to mix
between these two demands, he has to be indifferent between the two strategies:
(16) v-F(v) = m*(k)-
Condition (16) pins down the critical type vwho should be indifferent between entering with
the AT-technology and the ^-technology; V is the larger root to equation (16). See Figure 2.
Lemma3. v > v*(k) = k + m*(k) [> vc = KX+S + m
Proof. Recall that v is the larger root to equation (16):
Since <|)(v) = vF(v) is a quasi-concave function of v and at v , <j>'(v) <0, we have
v > v*(k) = k + m*(k).
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Figure 2. Equilibrium with Endogenous Choice of Technologies
A corollary of Lemma 3 is that there are two types of inefficiencies associated with the
availability of the short-term investment strategy k. First, there is too little entry compared to
the previous case \y*(k) > v c ) . Second, some of those who enter do so with an inefficient
technology fc(ve[v* (k), v]).
The mixing probability for the official is determined by the indifference condition for
the v -type. Let a be the probability that the official chooses to demand v . The condition for
the critical type to be indifferent between the two technologies is:
(17) v-K-ml+6'(l~a)'[v-m*(k)]=V'-k-ml+b'(l-a)-[v—k-m*(k)]
Therefore, the official charges v with probability a = [(l + 5)-&-X"]/[5&] and m*(k) with
probability (1 - a) = (K - k)/[bk].
Proposition 4. When the choice of technology is endogenous, the corrupt official employs a
mixed strategy with respect to his future bribery demand in equilibrium.
14
Proposition 4 explains why corruption is so often embedded with arbitrariness and
creates uncertainty. It also provides a new interpretation of Wei's (1997b) recent empirical
study on corruption. He examines the effect of corruption-induced uncertainty on foreign
direct investment and shows that the second moment (variability) effect is negative,
statistically significant and quantitatively large. For instance, an increase in the uncertainty
level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico, at the average level of corruption in his
sample, is equivalent to raising the tax rate by 32 percentage points. Wei's empirical result is
based on a model where the level of foreign investment is adversely affected by the increase
in the variability of the bribe rate due to the foreign investors' risk aversion. Our model,
however, suggests that there is no causal relationship between uncertainty and inefficient
investment behavior. In our model, the entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and the inefficiency
stems from the entrepreneurs' incentive to practice dynamic cream skimming. Uncertainty
per se is not a deterrent to investment. Uncertainty is rather a part of equilibrium and is
endogenously determined together with the level of investment and the choice of technology.
In Wei's model, uncertainty is treated as an exogenous variable. Thus, one obvious
policy implication of his model would be to make the bribery schedule as transparent as
possible to promote foreign direct investment. In contrast, our model not only explains the
genesis of corruption-induced uncertainty, but also demonstrates that arbitrariness is an
inseparable feature of corruption, which cannot be tackled in isolation.
IV. The Stability of a Corrupt Regime
We now consider how the stability of a corrupt regime affects economic performance. Let us
parametrize the stability of the regime by p which is the probability that the official will
remain in power in the second period. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, if the
corrupt official loses power in the second period, he is replaced by another corrupt official. In
this case, the change of power is irrelevant for the entrepreneurs while it matters a lot to the
original corrupt official who loses power. In the second scenario, the change of power takes
place through a genuine reform where corruption is eliminated in the second period. In this
15
section, we abstract from the issue of endogenous technology choice; only the /T-technology is
available to entrepreneurs. We also ignore discounting by setting 5=1.
IV. 1. Succession of Corrupt Regimes
Consider the case where the official in the first period remains in power only with probability
(3 in the second period. Thus, P plays the role of a discount factor for the official. If there is a
change of power, the office is transferred to another corrupt official. As a result, second
period demands will be independent of who is in power. Once again, it can be shown that the
optimal strategy in the second period is to extract the whole surplus of the marginal type who
entered in the first period without inducing any exit. Thus, the marginal type is given by
v= mx +K.
The maximization problem for the official in the first period then is:
(18) Max mx -F(mx + K) + f>-(mx + K)F(mx +K)
The first order condition is given by:
(19) F(mx + K) + [ml+^- K /(1 + P)]- F\mx + K) = 0
Totally differentiating Eq. (19) with respect to ml and P yields:
(20) [s.o.cW + K , • F1 (m. + K)d$ = 0,L
 ^
 l
 (1 + P)2
where [s.o.c] denotes the second order condition for (18) and is negative. Thus, we have
dmx I d$ < 0. As the corrupted regime becomes more stable, there will be more discounts in
the first period demand, which induces more entry in the first period.
Proposition 5. When a transfer of power may take place between corrupt officials, the
stability of the regime is conducive to economic performance. A policy that fights corruption
but cannot ensure that corrupt officials are replaced by honest ones is detrimental to economic
activity.
This result is complementary to Shleifer and Vishny (1993). They show in a static
setting that interagency externalities aggravate the problem of corruption in comparison to the
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simple monopoly corruption scheme. Weak governments cannot prevent its numerous
agencies from setting their own bribes independently, thus maximising the private profit of
each agency. When an entrepreneur who wants to start a business needs services from several
of these agencies, each agency will neglect the externality it creates on the bribery revenue of
other agencies. A higher bribery demand of one agency reduces the willingness to pay for
complementary services. Due to this externality, the amount of economic activity is lower in
equilibrium than with a monopoly corruption scheme. In our model, a stable regime enables
the official to internalize the intertemporal externality stemming from the existence of sunk
cost. Thus, the official is more willing to invest (discount) in the first period demand when he
is more confident that he would reap the benefits in the second period.
Our result also has implications for job transfers often observed in various
organizations such as planned enterprises in the former Soviet Union, the U.S. foreign service
and military. The practice can be puzzling since transferring individuals to new jobs
sacrifices job-specific human capital (Ickes and Samuelson, 1987). One explanation is that
job transfers prevent corruption by ensuring that employees do not occupy a job long enough
to reap the benefits of corrupt activities.12 Our model, however, suggests that job transfers
intended to mitigate corruption may have the exact opposite effect.
IV.2. Reform Case
Now consider the case where the corrupt regime may be replaced by an honest government
through a genuine reform. In this case, the transfer of power matters not only to the initial
corrupt official but also to entrepreneurs. If the corrupt official retains power in the second
period, it is optimal to extract the whole surplus of the marginal type who entered in the first
period without inducing any exit as in the previous case. However, in the case of genuine
reform, entrepreneurs may have an incentive to delay their investment, hoping for the
installation of a clean government. With international organisations such as the IMF and the
World Bank putting more emphasis on the efficiency of government institutions in aid-
12
 Other explanations for job transfers include mitigating the ratchet effect, sorting employees into the jobs
where they will be the most productive, and allowing potential future managers to gain familiarity with various
aspects of an organization's operations. See Ickes and Samuelson (1987) for details.
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receiving countries, this case has particular relevance for the future. In August 1997, for
instance, the IMF issued new guidelines making the reform of corrupt institutions a
prerequisite for financial aid [IMF 1997]. These conditionalities can be viewed as a sign of
national commitment to policy reforms for countries with weak domestic commitment
mechanisms [World Development Report 1997].
Given a bribery demand of mx, the marginal type who enters is defined by:
The left-hand side of Eq. (21) represents the expected payoff from entering in the first period
and the right-hand side represents the option value of delaying the investment until the second
period. The marginal type is given by v = mx + p • K . The maximization problem for the
official in the first period is:
(22) Max mx -F{mx +f>-K) + $-(mx +f>-K)F(mx +$K).
The first order condition is given by:
(23) F(mx + p • K) + [mx + (p2 • K)l(\ + P)J- F\mx + P • K) = 0
Thus, the optimal demand in the first period is
(24) m, = m * T—X - — ,
which we can rewrite as
[see (5) for the definition of the m*-function]. In general, the overall effect of the stability of
the regime on the first period bribery demand depends on the relative magnitude of the two
countervailing effects. As the probability of a new regime increases, the corrupt official has
less incentive to internalize the intertemporal externality and thus increases the bribery
demand in the first period. However, the entrepreneurs have less incentives to delay their
investments since the risk of ex post expropriation is reduced with the increase in the
probability of a new regime. Thus, the corrupt official can get away with less discount in the
first period.
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It turns out that the first effect dominates the second and we have dmx / J(3 < 0 as in
BK B2 •K
the previous case. To verify this, note that both and — in Eq. (24) are increasing
in (3 and that m*(.) is a decreasing function.
The effect of stability on the aggregate investment level, however, is opposite to the
previous case. The marginal type is given by:
(26) v = m,+/?K = m * ( £ ^ l £ ^
[l + fij 1 + /?
omww A + a ls increasing in P, the cut-off value v increases with p [see Eq. (8)]. We
conclude that the effect of stability of a corrupt regime on the extent of entry is harmful in
this case. In other words, the possibility of future reform has a positive effect on current
aggregate investment. Thus, it is important to distinguish the two cases of regime changes
since the stability of a corrupt regime has different implications for investment activities
depending on the nature of regime change.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed the consequences of repeated extortion. It turned out that the
repeated nature of extortion per se does not create further distortions in resource allocations.
There are no fewer businesses in operation when corrupt officials can make repeated bribery
demands than when there are once-and-for-all bribery payments. The reason is that a corrupt
official can properly discount his initial demand in order to induce the appropriate amount of
entry. The major inefficiency of repeated extortion emerges only when entrepreneurs have
discretionary power over the choice of technology. In that case, entrepreneurs react to the
dynamic path of bribery demands by distorting their choice of technology in the form of
inefficiently low sunk investments. This type of investment behavior allows them to react
more flexibly to future extortion. We have also shown how the stability of a corrupt regime
affects extortion and investment activities. A corrupt official who fears to lose his power in
the future becomes less willing to discount his future demands, thus driving more
entrepreneurs out of business.
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We conclude with a discussion on how the dynamic problem analyzed in the paper can
be applied to other situations that involve agents who have the power to extort. We also
mention how the basic framework can be extended depending on the contexts.
Organized Crime
The most obvious example is organized crime.13 Gangs charge 'protection money' from
businesses and this kind of extortion is typically done repeatedly. The dynamic nature of the
extortion game has serious consequences for behavior on both sides - the gang and the
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs become more reluctant to put larger sums in sunk investments.
They may choose technologies that are deemed inefficient in the absence of organized crime
to be able to react more flexibly to extortive threats. In response to the incomplete
information about the types of technologies chosen, the gang may randomly change the sum
of 'protection money' which it demands from businesses.
One important aspect of extortion that is not considered in our model is how gangs
actually try to overcome the information asymmetry in order to improve on their rewards of
extortion. This can be achieved, for instance, by forcing businesses to purchase
complementary inputs from gang owned firms. In the case of the Fulton Fish Market in
Manhattan, fish dealers were forced to hire certain (Mafia owned) companies performing the
loading function. This arrangement enabled the gang to observe how much fish was traded by
each dealer. The sums extorted from each fish dealer could then be related to the volume of
loaded or unloaded fish by charging excessive loading fees.14 In 1995, when the City of New
York installed a regulatory authority to manage the market in an effort to drive organized
crime out of Fulton Fish Market, loading costs dropped by 70 percent [Giuliani 1997].15
Sale of Public Offices
Sale of public offices was a prevalent phenomenon in many countries and over long periods in
the history of states. Sale of offices, in particular the offices of tax collectors, had great
13
 For an economic analysis of extortion by organized crime, see Konrad and Skaperdas [1997, forthcoming].
14
 The economic rationale for this arrangement is similar to the price discrimination motives for tying where the
practice serves as a metering device [Telser, 1979].
15
 It is estimated that the control over Fulton Fish Market brought $ 50 million a year into the mob's treasury
[Vulliamy 1998].
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advantages when the honesty of officials was hard to monitor or when the potential for tax
revenues in distant regions was largely unknown to the central government. Swart [1970]
reports that farming out taxes was a firmly established practice, e.g., in France, Spain, Turkey
and China. The sale of offices, however, also gave rise to mechanisms of repeated extortion
as described in this paper. When the official's contract was to be renewed, the ruler (king,
emperor...) could use the information from the earlier sale of office, thus reducing the tax
collector's incentive to invest in an efficient infrastructure for tax collection. Even worse, the
ruler could expropriate his former tax collector - a strategy that was already known to Roman
emperor Titus Flavius Vespasianus (9-79 A.D.).16 He sold the offices of procuratores (tax
collectors) to the most greedy men only to sentence them to high fines later on [Sturminger
1982, pp. 105f].17
Expropriation of Multinational Corporations
When it comes to foreign direct investment (FDI), the interaction between a multinational
firm and the government of the host country resembles in its structure the repeated extortion
game analyzed in this paper. If the government cannot credibly commit to future tax rates
(and certain property rights), this will make the foreign multinational more reluctant to invest
in the country. Potential investors anticipate that their bargaining position versus the
government is weakened once it has incurred the sunk costs of irreversible investments. The
investors may mitigate the consequences of the unfavorable ex post bargaining position by
reducing the capital intensity of their investment projects [Doyle and van Wijnbergen 1994].
As the lack of commitment to future tax rates works against the host country's own interests,
it has an incentive to counteract the consequences of its own opportunistic ex post behavior by
ex ante granting tax holidays. The potentially high tax payments in the future are
compensated by a zero tax rate or even by subsidies in the initial period [Bond and Samuelson
1989].
16
 Vespasian was known for his rigor in tax collection to balance the government budget. He even introduced a
tax on urine to be paid by tanners who used urine in the production process. When his son Titus felt disgusted
and complained, Vespasian showed him a coin and responded with the now famous dictum: "Non olet" (Money
doesn't stink).
17
 It is, however, not reported by historians whether this type of behavior was anticipated by the tax collectors
and reduced their initial bids for the offices.
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Appendix
Appendix Al: Proof that it is optimal to have a constant number of firms in the market
1. The Commitment Case
Let us denote the marginal types in period 1 and period 2 as v, and v2, respectively. We show
that it is optimal for the official to have v, = v2.
Case 1. v, > v2
In this case, the official attracts new entrants in the second period. For this to happen, the
second period demand should be/w2 = v2 - K. For the marginal type v, to enter in the first
period, the following two conditions must be satisfied:
mx+S-m2 < v, • (1 + S)-K
5• (vx -K-m2)<vx • (1 + S)-K-(mx +S m2)
The first one is that the marginal entrepreneur of type v, makes nonnegative profit with the
first period entry. The second constraint is that he prefers to enter in the first period rather
than to delay the entry until the second period. It can be easily verified that the first constraint
is not binding. As a result, mx =vx-(l-b)-K. We can write the revenue for the official as a
function of the marginal types in each period:






Note that [F(vx) - F(v2 )J is a negative number when v, > v2.
Case 2. v, < v2
In this case, there is no new entry in the second period and some firms that entered in the first
period exit in the second period. For this to happen, the corrupt official has to charge
mx = Vj - K and m2 = v2. Also for case 2, we calculate the official's revenue:
(A.2) K
F(v,)+S K2
 1 + 8.
Note that [F(v2) - F(v, )J is a negative number when v, < v2.
1 + 8
Case 3. v, = v2
In this case, the same firms are in the business in both periods. The marginal type is given by
Vj = v2 = v = [K + mx + 8 • m2) I (1 + 8). The revenue for the official is:






The comparison of (A.T), (A.2) and (A.3) makes it clear that the revenue for the official is
maximized with monetary demands that induce v, = v2.
2. The Non-Commitment Case
To the contrary, assume that the optimal demand scheme induces v, > v2. Then, the second
period marginal type is given as v2 * = argmax (v2 - K) • F(v2). The overall revenue for the
official amounts to
(A.4) RNC(vl>v2)
Thus, reducing v, closer to v2 = v2* can increase the official's revenue by increasing both
(v, - K) - F(vx) and 5 • K • F(vx). Thus, v, > v2 cannot be part of the optimal demand
scheme.
Similarly, assume that the optimal demand scheme induces v, < v2. Then, the second
period marginal entrepreneur is determined as v2 * * = argmax v2 • F(v2). The overall
revenue for the official is given by:
(A.5) RNC(Vl < v2)=[v, -kl-FiyJ + d.Vt **-F(v2 **)
= vrF(vl)+d-v2**.F(v2**)-K-F(vl)
Thus, increasing v, closer to v2 = v2** can increase the official's revenue by increasing
v, •F(Vj) and decreasing KF(y{). Thus, v,< v2 cannot be part of the optimal demand
scheme, either. QED.
Appendix A2: Sketch of the proof for Proposition 3
Suppose to the contrary that there is a pure strategy equilibrium where the official demands m,
and m2 in the first and second periods, respectively. Then, in this equilibrium, any type v such
that
( v - K - m 1 ) + 5• (v-m 2 ) > max[v-k-m ] ,0]
will enter with the ^f-technology. In other words, the choice of technology in the first period
is characterized by a cut-off rule such that any type above the critical value V enters with the
K-technology, where v is defined by
(v - K - mx) + S - (v - m2) = max[v - k - ml ,0].
That is,
[_ l / O /I + 0
For m2 to be the optimal choice for the official in the second period, m2 should be either v or
m*(k).
Suppose that m2 = v. In this case, the critical type vwho is supposed to choose the
.^-technology gets no surplus in the second period. As a result, the type vcan be better off by
deviating with the k-technology and saving (K-k). Thus, we have a contradiction.
Suppose now that m2 =m*(k). For m*(k) to be the optimal choice in the second
period, the marginal entrant v = k + m * (k) in the second period should have not entered with
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the AT-technology in the first period. However, it can be easily verified that this type is better
off with choosing the AT-technology in the first period. Once again, we have a contradiction.
QED.
Appendix A3: Proof of Lemma 3
In general, we allow that the second period demand by the official, m2, can be a random
variable to accommodate the possibility of a mixed strategy. Then, given w,, the expected
value of entering with ^-technology for type v is given by:
n(K,v) = v-K-mx + 5-E[y-m2|v> m2]
Similarly, the expected value of entering with the ^-technology is:
n(k,v) = v-k-mx + 8 • E[v - k - m 2 v >
The difference between these two choices is:
n(K,v)-n(k,v) =
2\v>m2 >v-k}
Let G(.) denote the distribution of m2, that is, G(x) = Pr[w2 < x]. Then,
[kGdm
where the last line follows by integration by parts.
As a result, we have
G ( v ) G ( v t ) ^ 0
dv
Since n(K,v)-n(k,v) is an increasing function of v, the choice of technology is
characterized by a cut-off rule.
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